Abstract-We consider a class of games, termed as aggregative games, being played over a distributed multiagent networked system. In an aggregative game, an agent's objective function is coupled through a function of the aggregate of all agents decisions. Every agent maintains an estimate of the aggregate and agents exchange this information over a connected network. We study the gossip-based distributed algorithm for the exchange of information and computation of equilibrium decisions of agents over the network. Our primary emphasis lies in proving the convergence of the algorithm under an assumption of a diminishing (agent-specific) stepsize sequence. Under standard conditions, we establish the almost-sure convergence of the generated sequence to the unique equilibrium point.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an aggregative Nash game, each agent's objective is dependent on its own action and the aggregate of the actions taken by all agents [1] . Nash-Cournot games represent one instance of such games; here firms make quantity bids that fetch a price based on aggregate quantity sold, implying that the payoff function of any player is a function of aggregate quantity sold [2] , [3] . This paper considers an aggregative game in which agents are coupled by the aggregate of all agent decisions. Our goal lies in studying a gossip algorithm for information exchange and equilibrium computation when the agents do not have a full access to the aggregate of their decisions. Instead, each agent may communicate only with his local neighbors, where the neighborhoods are defined by a network modeling the connectivity structure among the agents. Under this limited communication regime, it is not possible for any agent to have knowledge of the true aggregate and, thus, the computation of an equilibrium point is more involved.
In the present work, we propose a gossip-based algorithm that allows agents to build estimates and compute an equilibrium point of an aggregative game. Importantly, this computation can be carried out in Koshal and Nedić are in the department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana IL 61801, while Shanbhag is in the department of Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering at the Penn. State University, University Park, 16802. Email: {koshal1,angelia}@illinois.edu and {udaybag}@uiuc.edu. Nedić and Shanbhag gratefully acknowledge the NSF support of this work through grant NSF CMMI 09-48905 EAGER ARRA. a distributed and asynchronous manner. In a gossipbased algorithm, an agent randomly wakes up, selects a neighboring agent and performs an information exchange and mixing operation. As such, the algorithm is inherently distributed and asynchronous and allows the agents to use uncoordinated step sizes. When the network is connected, the algorithm produces a sequence that converges almost-surely to an equilibrium point for a (random) diminishing stepsize rule independently selected by each agent. The novelty of this work is in our examination of gossip-based algorithms for computation of a Nash equilibrium point while the majority of preceding efforts have been applied towards the solution of feasibility and optimization problems. Succinctly, the main contributions of this work are in developing a gossip algorithm for aggregative Nash games and proving that it produces sequences that converge almostsurely to the unique equilibrium.
This paper finds relevance in the larger context of aggregative games [4] , [5] , [6] . Distributed algorithms for computing Nash equilibria have received significant attention recently [7] , [8] , [9] . Our work considers a class of aggregative Nash games for which regularized stochastic approximation schemes were developed for more generalized stochastic counterparts in [10] . More generally, the work in this paper is related to the gossipbased algorithms introduced in [11] [12] . Since then, such schemes have received significant attention from a wide range of applications. Distributed gossip-based schemes have been studied for distributed averaging with quantization constraints are proposed in [13] , [14] , and in optimization over network [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the problem of interest, propose a gossip-based algorithm, and state our assumptions. In section III, we study the convergence of the algorithm for a diminishing stepsize. We conclude in section IV.
Throughout this paper, we view vectors as columns. We write x T to denote the transpose of a vector x, and x T y to denote the inner product of vectors x and y. We use x = √
x T x to denote the Euclidean norm of a vector x. We use Π K to denote the Euclidean projection operator on a set K, i.e. Π K (x) argmin z∈K x − z . The expectation of a random variable Y is denoted by E[Y ] and a.s. denotes almost surely.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND BACKGROUND In this section we introduce an aggregative game and set up the equilibrium problem of our interest. We also discuss the connectivity graph for the agents and present our gossip-based algorithm.
A. Aggregative game
Let N = {1, . . . , N } be a set of N agents indexed by 1, . . . , N. The problem of interest requires agent i solving the following parameterized problem:
where K i ⊆ R and the function f i is of the form
The term c i (x i ) denotes the agent specific cost while U (x) captures the utility associated with aggregate outputx, which is given bȳ x = N j=1 x j with x j ∈ K j . The cost c i (x i ) and the set K i are known only to agent i, while the function U (y) is known by all agents. We letK = N i=1 K i , denote the Minkowski sum of the sets K i and we make the following assumptions on the constraint sets K i and the functions f i .
Assumption 1: For i = 1, . . . , N , the set K i ⊆ R is compact and convex and the function f i (x i , y) is continuously differentiable in (x i , y) over some open set containing the set K i ×K. Furthermore, f i (x i ,x) is convex in x i over the set K i for everyx ∈K.
Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium conditions of the game in (1) can be characterized by a scalar variational inequality problem denoted by VI(K, F ) where
T ,x ∈K, and x i ∈ K i for all i. Note that, by Assumption 1, the set K is a compact and convex set in R N . The mapping F maps x ∈ K to F (x) ∈ R N . We use F i to denote the i-th coordinate of the mapping F . To emphasize the particular form that F i has, we will write F i (x i ,x) for the value F i (x). Thus, with this notation, we have
where
. We now state our assumptions on the mapping F i , the ith coordinate mapping of F in (2). Assumption 2: For each F i (x i ,x) the following hold: (i) The mapping F i (x i ,x) is Lipschitz continuous in x i , for every fixedx ∈K i.e., for some L i > 0 and for all x i , y i ∈ K i ,
(ii) The mapping F i (x i , u) is Lipschitz continuous in u, for every fixed x i ∈ K i i.e., for some L −i > 0 and for all u, z ∈K,
It is relatively straightforward to see that such assumptions hold with little difficulty when considering NashCournot games with affine price functions.
As a consequence of Assumption 2 it can be seen that the gradient map F is also Lipschitz over K, i.e.,
. We assume that no central entity exists that can provide the aggregatex of agent decisions x i at any time. However, we allow agents to be connected so they can communicate locally with their neighbors. Under this restriction, we are interested in designing an algorithm for computing an equilibrium of aggregative game (1).
B. Gossip algorithm
We propose a gossip-based algorithm for computing an equilibrium of aggregative game (1). In our algorithm, each agent maintains an estimate of the true aggregatex while taking decisions within his constraint set that minimize his objective function. To estimate the aggregatex of decisions, each agent communicates at randomly specified instances with his neighbors at which instance the exchange of their estimates takes place.
We model the agent connectivity structure by an undirected graph G(N , E), with node i ∈ N being agent i and E being the set of undirected edges among the agents. When {i, j} ∈ E, the agents i and j can talk to each other and exchange some information. Let N i denote the set of agents who are immediate neighbors of agent i, i.e., N i = {j | {i, j} ∈ E}. We employ the following assumption on the connectivity graph G(N , E).
We use a gossip protocol to model agent exchange of the estimates of the aggregatex, which is varying in time as the agents decisions are changing. In the gossip-based information exchange, each agent is assumed to have a local clock which ticks according to a Poisson process with rate 1. At a tick of its clock, an agent i wakes up and contacts its neighbor j ∈ N i with probability p ij . The agents' clocks processes can be equivalently modeled as a single (virtual) clock which ticks according to a Poisson process with rate N . We assume that only one agent wakes up at each tick of the global clock, and we let Z k denote kth tick time of the global Poisson process. We discretize time so that time k corresponds to the time-slot 
whereas other agents do nothing, i.e.,v
To capture this step, we define the weight matrix W (k):
where e i is N -dimensional vector with ith entry equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. By using W (k) we can rewrite the intermittent estimate computation, as follows:
where x 0 i ∈ K i are initial agent decisions. Using this aligned aggregate estimatev k i and his own iterate x k i , agent i updates its iterate and average estimate as follows:
where, 1 {i∈{I k ,J k }} denotes the indicator of the event {i ∈ {I k , J k }}, α k,i is the stepsize for agent i and
To take account for the history, we introduce F k to denote the σ−algebra generated by the entire history up to k. More precisely, with F 0 = {x
The stepsize update rule is defined by the frequency of agent updates, i.e. α k,i = 1 Γ k (i) , where Γ k (i) denotes the number of updates that agent i has executed up to time k inclusively. Some long term estimates for α k,i that we use in our analysis are given in the following lemma (cf. [18] , Lemma 3). In particular, this result ensures that the prescribed steplength sequence adheres to the required summability requirements that allow for claiming the a.s. convergence of the produced sequence.
Lemma 1: Let Assumption 3 hold and let p min = min i∈N p i . Let α k,i = 1/Γ k (i) for all k and i. Also let q ∈ (0, 1/2). Then there is a large enoughk =k(q, N ) such that for all k ≥k and i ∈ N a.s.,
In our analysis we also use a well-known result on supermartingale convergence, which we provide in the following lemma for convenience. The result can be found in [19] , Lemma 11, page 50.
Lemma 2: Let V k , u k , β k and γ k be non-negative random variables adapted to σ-algebra F k . If almost surely
then almost surely V k converges and
III. CONVERGENCE THEORY In this section we establish the convergence of the gossip algorithm for the aggregative game in (1). We consider an agent specific diminishing stepsize of the form α k,i = 1 Γ k (i) . First we state some results which will allow us to claim the convergence of the algorithm. These results involve the average y k of the estimates v k i , i ∈ N , given by
where 1 denotes the vector in R N with all entries equal to 1. We have the following result.
Lemma 3: Letv
, wherev k i and v k are given respectively by (5) and (8) . Then, we have
Proof: We first bound the term
Using the weight matrix W (k), we can express the update of v k+1 in (8), as
T . From the decision update rule of (7), we have
Since y k is the average of entries in v k , i.e. we have
and I denotes the identity matrix. By construction W (k) is a stochastic matrix i.e. W (k)1 = 1. Thus D(k)1 = 0, implying that D(k)y k 1 = 0. Thus we have
By taking the norm and the conditional expectation w.r.t.
.
We first estimate Term 1.
where we use the fact that v k is adapted to F k . To estimate Term 2, we employ the spectral properties of M to obtain:
Using the non-expansive property of the projection operator and α 
By Assumption 1, the gradients are uniformly bounded, i.e., F i (x i , y) ≤ C for all i and some C > 0. This and
Combining the estimate of Term1 and Term2 we find
kpmin C, which after some algebra leads to
Since λ ∈ (0, 1) we have 1 − √ λ > 0. Thus by supermartingale convergence of Lemma 2, we have
We further have
By Lemma 2 (applied with an index shift) and Eq. (10), we find
s. This relation, combined with the doubly stochastic nature of W (k) and convexity of the Euclidean norm yields
s. As we will see, y k will play a key role in establishing the convergence of projection algorithm. One important property of y k is that we have
k not only captures the average belief of the agents in the network but also represents the true average information, as seen in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Consider y k specified in (9). Then we have
We show this by induction on k. Note that for k = 0 this holds trivially, as we have v 0 j = x 0 j . Assuming the relation holds for k − 1, as the induction step, we have
where we use the fact that W (k) is doubly stochastic and in the last equality, we use the induction hypothesis. Thus,
We now show the convergence of the algorithm. We have the following result, where x * denotes the unique Nash equilibria for aggregative game in (1).
Proposition 1: Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. Also let the mapping F be strictly monotone over the set K, i.e. (F (x) − F (y))
T (x − y) > 0 for all x, y ∈ K, where the equality holds only for x = y. Then, the sequence {x k } generated by the method (7) with stepsize
converges to the (unique) x * of the game almost surely.
Proof: Since the map is strictly monotone, there is a unique Nash equilibrium x * ∈ K (see Theorem 2.3.3 in [20] ). Then, by the definition of x k+1 i
we have
Using
and the nonexpansive property of the projection operator, we have for i ∈ {I k+1 , J k+1 },
kpi using Lemma 1, we obtain
We now approximate the inner product term by adding and subtracting F i (x k i , N y k ) and using
(cf. Lemma 4), as follows:
Similar operations on the square norm term yield
where we use (a + b) 2 ≤ 2(a 2 + b 2 ). Substituting the preceding two bounds in (11), after rearranging the terms, we obtain
Applying ±2a T b ≤ a 2 + b 2 to the following terms
and, by combining the common terms and using the Lipschitz property of the mapping F i (Assumption 2 (ii)) we obtain for i ∈ {I k , J k },
From the fact that
We combine these two cases with the fact that agent i updates with probability p i , where we bound p i by the maximum value p max = max i p i , and thus obtain for all i ∈ N ,
Summing over all i = 1, . . . , N and using the notation given in (3), we further obtain
Using Lipschitz continuity of the mapping F with constant L (see Eq. (4)) and gathering the common terms, we have for all k ≥k withk large enough,
We now apply the supermartingale convergence lemma (to a delayed sequence). For q ∈ (0, 1/2) we have 
By Lemma 2 we conclude that, almost surely
Since {x k } ⊂ K and K is compact (Assumption 1), {x k } has accumulation points in K. By (13) and 1/k = ∞ it follows that (x k − x * ) T (F (x k ) − F (x * )) → 0 along a subsequence, say {x k }, a.s. This and the strict monotonicity of F imply that {x k } → x * as → ∞ a.s. By relation (12) , the entire sequence converges to x * a.s.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper focuses on a class of Nash games in which user interactions are seen through the aggregate sum of all players' actions. These agents are a part of network with limited connectivity which only allows for restricted local communication. We propose a gossipbased distributed algorithm which abides the information exchange restriction for computation of equilibrium point. Our algorithm allows for asynchronous implementation with distributed architecture. The contribution of our work can broadly be summarized as: (1) the development of an asynchronous distributed algorithm for aggregative games over graphs; and (2) the establishment of the convergence of the algorithm (with agent specific stepsizes) to an equilibrium point.
